南京师范大学 摘要：最近一次的金融危机揭示了在大量信息不对称，金融尝新复杂和监管框架不完整这样的金融世界里，“自我调节”显然不能起到作用。本文认为，已经至少有两个主要政策影响着金融危机。一个是监督管理政策，另一个是货币政策。此外，本文还分析了中央银行能如何来帮助避免下一场财政危机。特别是，对于宏观审慎性政策的作用和限制进行了讨论。
关键词：财政危机审慎性监管货币政策
Abstract:The recent financial crisis revealed that in a world of large asymmetries of information,of complex financial innovations and incomplete regulatory frame works“self regulation” obviously does not work.This paper argues that there have been,at least,two main contributors to the recent financial crisis.The one is supervision and regulation policy,the other is monetary policy.Moreover,this paper analyses what central banks can do to help avoid a next financial crisis.In particular,the role and limits of supplementary macro-prudential instruments are discussed.
Keywords:Financial crisisPrudential regulationMonetary policy
??1 Introduction
When theUS subprime crisis occurred in August,2007,it was first interpreted as an apparently rather small,regional brush fire.However,despite quick reactions from politicians,it soon developed into a global slump.In the face of tightening credit conditions,activity slowed and advanced economies fell into mild recession by mid-2008,whereas emerging and developing economies continued to grow.
However,one has to accept that policymakers have basically the same problems in processing information as those confronting private agents.Therefore,it is not always guaranteed that supervisory and regulatory authorities perform their job perfectly or always head off crises.Still,when supervision and regulation policy fails and a financial shock occurs,monetary and fiscal policymakers are usually expected to manage the economic danger effectively,i.e.to minimize it and its costs and to avoid its escalation into a full-scale political disaster or even,a worst-case scenario,an undermining of the economic system.
??2 Failures on the part of supervision and regulation policy
There have been numerous failures on the part of supervision and regulation policy,particularly the ignoring of incentive distortions and information problems that were intrinsic to the new process of financial intermediation.I shall merely list the major omissions.
2.1 The interconnected nature of the financial system
A major failure of regulation was that because it did not focus on the externalities that contributed to systemic risk,the risk incurred by each bank was treated in isolation.It was not taken into account that banks forced into fire-sales also depressed prices for other banks or that banks that hoarded funds or hid their own commitments created other externalities by producing uncertainty for their counterparties.When these networks and associated dangers became obvious,a crisis in confidence occurred.
Due to the fact that financial intermediation had evolved into a highly complex and inscrutable network and a major source of uncertainty,the near-meltdown in the financial sector then resulted in a more general increase in uncertainty,leading to a raise in precautionary savings and the postponement of planned investment projects.
2.2 Incentive distortions in remuneration contracts
This means that these remuneration contracts offered potentially unlimited upside rewards,but capped the downside losses;thus traders sought short-run profits and accepted excessive risk in the bargain.This procedure led,among other things,to excessive leverage ratios for shareholders and the system as a whole.
??3 Role and auxiliary functions of monetary policy
3.1 Justification and review of benign neglect
The question remains whether the central banks should continue to stick to a policy of benign neglect.This position was based on the view that detecting an asset price bubble was only possible in retrospect,since bubbles cannot be identified early in real-time;and that only a very large increase in policy rates could stop such a boom,a policy that risks creating exactly the shock to the real economy it attempts to avoid.That is,monetary policy was regarded to be a blunt weapon for stopping an asset/housing-price boom and could only be successful by involving substantial collateral damage to the real economy.
A second problem associated with the policy of the US-Fed was the asymmetry of its strategy regarding its announcement of how to act if an asset price boom deflates.
All in all,it is still an open question in the literature whether a pro-active monetary policy strategy is superior to a re-active （or even a benign-neglect） one.However,recent analyses have put the pro-active strategy in a more favorable light.
??4 Conclusions and lessons
This change in paradigm has,in part,been created or,at least,strengthened through the process of financial globalization.Globalization leads to increasing,and increasingly unfamiliar,linkages and interdependencies that can easily turn critical.
Therefore,politicians should think twice before binding their hands in times of massive uncertainty.It may be better if they try to implement diligent and,however easy-to-understand,flexible strategies and simultaneously combine them with a new and rigorous transparent communication policy.Such a policy strategy would,of course,have to include interest-rate policy in order to be able to react promptly to unforeseen events.
I would like to conclude with an even more general point.Not only monetary and regulatory policymakers have to learn their lessons from the financial crisis and to rethink their strategies.This reorientation alone may not afford us more beneficial practical solutions,but it would avoid our losing focus and relying too much on highly stylized model-based results in political consultation.
References
［1］Jorion.Philippe,Risk: Measuring the risk in value at risk,Financial Analysts Journal,1996
［2］Philippe Jorion,The New Benchmark for Controlling Derivatives Risk
［3］Fama,E.F.,1965,The Behavior Stock Market Prices,The Journal of Business
［4］Dana R Hermanson,The Implications Of COSO.
（责任编辑：刘 璐）